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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
TAXATION OF IMPUTED INCOME
INTRODUCrION
Imputed income has been defined as:
[a] flow of satisfactions from durable goods owned and
used by the taxpayer, or from goods and services arising out
of the personal exertions of the taxpayer on his own behalf.'
This definition of imputed income recognizes two catego-
ries-imputed income from assets and imputed income from self-
service and leisure. To describe further the definition of imputed
income and explain how taxation of imputed income tends toward
equalization,2 the following examples are presented.
Imputed Income from Assets
An analysis of the concept and taxation of imputed income of
assets will be based upon several different hypothetical fact situa-
tions:3 (1) the taxation of imputed rent; (2) the taxation of imputed
income from bank accounts; and (3) the taxation of imputed income
from prepaid insurance policies.
With reference to imputed rent, assume that two taxpayers, A
and B, each have $50,000 to invest. Further, assume that A pur-
chases a $50,000 home for his own residence, while B invests his cash
in a regular savings account at his local savings and loan. If B's
savings account yields five percent per year, then B will receive
$2,500 as interest on his investment after one year. Current income
tax law requires B to include this $2,500 along with his other taxable
income for taxing purposes. A has no income on his investment in
1. Marsh, Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. Sci. Q. 514, 514 (1943). See also Balch,
Individual Income Taxes and Housing, 11 NAT'L TAX J. 168, 168-69 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as Balch], which refers to Marsh's definition as the most generally accepted definition of
imputed income.
2. The purpose of recognizing imputed income in the area of taxation is to produce a
more equitable income tax. Haskell & Kauffman, Taxation of Imputed Income: The Bargain
Purchase Problem, 17 NAT'L TAX J. 232, 233 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Haskell & Kauff-
man].
3. See W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 18 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
VICKREY], which explains what constitutes imputed income from assets.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(4).
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his home that is taxable under the Internal Revenue Code. Thus,
although both A and B invest cash in assets of similar value, only
B is taxed on the income. The theory of imputed income, however,
maintains that for equal treatment of investments, A should be
taxed on the rental value of his home. If A decides to rent his house
at, for example, $2,500 per year, rather than living in it, such
amount is taxable to A as rental income.' Consequently, A's invest-
ment allows him the option under present law either to rent it and
realize taxable income, or live in it himself and not be taxed. The
taxation of imputed rent requires that if A decides to remain in his
own house, he is required to include in his taxable income the
amount at which he could rent his house to others. The result of
the acceptance of the concept of taxation of imputed rent is that A
will be required to include $2,500 in taxable income whether or not
he rents his home. If he rents it, $2,500 will be deemed taxable as
rental income. If he does not rent it, $2,500 will be taxable as im-
puted rent. Requiring A to include $2,500 in taxable income whether
or not he rents the home equalizes the tax treatment of A's invest-
ment and B's investment, i.e., both must include in income a fair
return on their respective investments.
Imputed income from assets is further illustrated by two exam-
ples regarding bank accounts. The first example shows that inequity
in taxation results when no service charge is imposed on a bank
checking account with a specified minimum balance. Assume that
there is no checking account service charge if the account is above
a specified minimum balance.7 Further assume that a depositor
whose account balance is below the minimum amount has addi-
tional funds to invest. He may deposit such amount in the checking
account, thus escaping the service charge (assuming of course that
the required minimum balance is met), or he may deposit it in a
savings account which earns taxable interest. Since the latter choice
results in the depositor being charged a service charge because the
minimum balance is not met, inequity results. Although adding
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(5).
6. Numerous methods of equalization will be discussed infra. See notes 47-50 infra and
accompanying text. Some writers refer to imputed rent as "the benefit received by an individ-
ual through the use of his own real estate." Balch, supra note 1, at 168. See also Schoenfeld
& Steinberg, The Federal Income Tax in Relation to Housing: A Commentary, 24 THE TAx
LAW. 347 (1970-71) [hereinafter cited as Schoenfeld & Steinberg].
7. VICKREY, supra note 3, at 32-33.
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money to the checking account sufficient to meet the minimum
balance is worth the amount of the service charge which is not
charged to the depositor, it is not taxed under current law. The
taxation of imputed income in this area requires the depositor to
include in his taxable income any service charges that were avoided
because the minimum balance requirements were met. Equity in
taxation results since the depositor is taxed whether he places the
additional funds in a checking account or in a savings account. If
the funds are added to the checking account, taxation of imputed
income requires inclusion of the value received, i.e., the avoided
service charge. If the funds are invested in the savings account, then
the interest earned is taxable. Equalization of the tax treatment of
the different investments is therefore afforded.
The second example of imputed income of bank accounts in-
volves free services which some banks provide to certain customers
who maintain substantial checking account balances. This example
illustrates that inequity ensues when services performed for a bank
depositor are not taxed. For instance, a recent newspaper article
stated that at least one major bank provides free of charge to cus-
tomers with a minimum checking account balance of $25,000 a
highly trained staff that performs personal secretarial assignments,
secures theater and travel reservations and offers investment ad-
vice.' Taxation of imputed income in this example equalizes the tax
treatment between the individual who has the $25,000 checking
account and the one who does not have such an account. To clarify
the concept, assume that A has a $25,000 checking account while B
does not. Both desire secretarial services. A receives the secretarial
services free from the bank; B, however, must hire a secretary at his
own expense. The inequity in tax treatment develops because A
receives services without ever paying taxes on them. A receives nei-
ther interest nor similar taxable income under the arrangement. B
is in a different situation. He must pay for such secretarial services
by hiring a secretary. Inequity develops because B must use cash
which he earned as wages and on which he paid taxes to pay for the
secretarial services.
8. N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1968, at 29, col. 1. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX
BASE 324 (Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM]; Bittker, A Comprehensive
Tax Base as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Bittker].
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To equalize the two situations, taxation of imputed income
would require that A include in income the amount that he would
have been required to pay for the services had he hired his own
secretary. A and B would be in similar tax positions because each
includes in income the value of the services of the secretary. A,
under the concept of taxation of imputed income, includes this
amount at the time the secretarial services are performed, whereas
B includes the same amount in his taxable income when he earns
the money that is used to pay the secretary.
Finally, the taxation of imputed income from assets may be
illustrated by prepaid insurance policies. Insurance coverage over a
period in excess of one year can usually be paid by either a series of
annual premiums or one lump-sum payment at the beginning of the
policy period. It is important to note that the amount of the lump-
sum payment is usually less than the total of all the annual prem-
iums. This is due in part to the concept of the time value of money.
The insurance company is willing to accept less money at the start
of the policy period because it obviously has a longer period of time
to invest the premiums received. The nontaxability of the difference
between the lump-sum amount and the total of the annual prem-
iums produces inequity. For example, assume that A and B each
have cash sufficient to pay the lump-sum payment. A prepays his
insurance in one lump-sum payment, while B decides against the
lump-sum payment. B pays the first annual premium and invests
the remaining cash until the next premium is due. A recognizes no
taxable income from this transaction, yet in the first year B is taxed
on the interest he earns on the money he invests. A is able to retain
an amount of money approximately equal to the amount that he
would have earned had he invested the money and actually earned
interest. In effect, A's retention of the money is similar to an actual
earning of interest because the total amount of cash that he pays to
the insurance company is less than the total that B pays for the
same period of coverage. Equalization of the taxation of this trans-
action requires A to be taxed on the amount that he saves by paying
in one lump-sum at the beginning of the policy period rather than
by paying the annual premiums
9. See Rev. Rul. 65-199, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 20, which recognizes that the difference
between the lump-sum payment and the total of the annual premiums is nontaxable. See
also VICKREY, supra note 3, at 32-33, which describes the application of imputed income to
prepaid insurance examples.
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Imputed Income from Self-Service and Leisure
The second category of imputed income noted in the definition
is imputed income from self-service and leisure.'" Several examples
illustrate the concept and taxation of imputed income from self-
service and leisure. The first example involves a professional car-
penter who performs carpentry work on his own house." Under cur-
rent law, the carpenter does not recognize taxable income. Inequity
in taxation results because if anyone other than the above men-
tioned carpenter performs the work, that person is taxed on the
compensation or wages received.'" To equalize the two situations,
the concept of taxation of imputed income from self-service and
leisure requires the carpenter to include in his own income an
amount equal to the value of the services he performs on his own
home. Equalization results because whoever does the work must
include the value of such services in income. If the homeowner per-
forms the work, taxation of imputed income requires inclusion of the
value of such work. (It should be emphasized that it is not within
the scope of this note to consider the problems arising in the valua-
tion of one's own services.) If anyone other than the homeowner
performs the work, then the compensation received from the home-
owner as wages is taxable. The same principle is applicable in the
case where an accountant remains at home to perform some ama-
teur plumbing, 3 thus emphasizing that the concept of taxation of
imputed income from self-service and leisure is applicable even
though the services performed are not similar to the taxpayer's vo-
cation.'4
The value of the services of the housewife-mother is another
example of imputed income from self-service and leisure. As in
many other cases, this situation raises much controversy because
the application of imputed income in this area would affect many
people. Assume that two similar families with working husbands
have the wives, A and B, at home caring for the children. Also
10. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
11. VICKREY, supra note 3, at 44.
12. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(1).
13. VICKREY, supra note 3, at 44.
14. See Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practical-
ities of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, .81 HAuv. L. REv. 1016, 1016-17 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Galvin], where the principle in the second example is recognized.
19741 et al.: The Constitutionality of the Taxation of Imputed Income
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assume that A decides to work outside the home and employs a
nursemaid to care for her children. B, however, decides to remain
at home and care for her children herself. A is taxed on the wages
she earns outside the home. 5 B, since she receives no wages, reports
no income. Inequity of taxation ensues because A pays for the child
care services with after-tax dollars while B is not affected taxwise.
This is similar to the reasoning in the second bank account example
(free secretarial service)."
Congress recognized the inequity arising in the child care situa-
tion and passed section 210 of the Revenue Act of 1971.1 Section 210
provides a deduction from the taxable income of the working mother
for child care expenses incurred as a result of her employ-
ment." It is important to note that Congress recognized the concept
of taxation of imputed income only indirectly. The recognition of
imputed income is indirect because instead of requiring the mother
who remains home to include the value of the household services she
performs in income, section 210 allows the mother who works out-
side the home to deduct certain expenses she incurs by hiring baby-
sitters. 9 Perhaps the testimony before the House Committee on
15. Taxable income shall include compensation. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(1).
16. See note 8 supra.
17. Section 210 of the Revenue Act of 1971 amended INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 214. For
analysis of whether a child care expense is deductible when it is a necessary prerequisite to
employment see Hjorth, A Tax Subsidy for Child Care: Section 210 of the Revenue Act of
1971, 50 TAXES 133, 137 (1972).
For a detailed explanation of how this section of the Code expands the provisions with
respect to the dependent care expenses see Strueling, The New Household Service Expense
and Dependent Care Expense Deduction: Who Will Benefit?, 50 TAXES 589 (1972).
For alternatives to the old statute regarding child care deductions which are based on
imputed income theory see Comment, The Child Care Deduction: Issues Raised by Michael
and Elizabeth Nammack and the Pending Amendment to Section 214, 10 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 270 (1971).
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 214(b)(2) provides:
The term "employment-related expenses" means amounts paid for the following
expenses, but only if such expenses are incurred to enable the taxpayer to be gainfully
employed:
(A) expenses for household services, and
(B) expenses for the care of a qualifying individual.
19. Smith v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1938), aff'd mem., 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940),
where the taxpayer had deducted the cost of wages paid to nursemaids who cared for her child
while she was gainfully employed, was analyzed in Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Compar-
ative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971).
While the court in Smith recognized that housekeeping services are nontaxable imputed
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 8
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Ways and Means of a noted tax expert sheds light on the fact that
Congress only indirectly recognized the taxation of imputed income
of housewives. The expert stated that
[a] famous case of income in kind is the services of the
housewife. It is not possible perhaps even theoretically to
impute a market value for each of the many types of serv-
ices rendered. Yet to omit imputation clearly discriminates
in favor of the housewife by comparison to the wife who
chooses to work outside the home for a monetary wage.2"
A final example of imputed income from self-service and leisure
deals with farm produce consumed on the farm.2 ' Under current law,
the farmer who consumes his own farm produce is not required to
include its value in his taxable income.2" Since all other consumers
must purchase their produce, inequity in taxation develops for the
same reason as in the example of the carpenter doing his own car-
pentry. 23 The farmer is not affected taxwise, while the ordinary con-
sumer must purchase produce with after-tax dollars. These dollars
are after-tax because the dollars are usually from wages less income
taxes paid by the ordinary consumer. Equalization of tax treatment
income, it concluded that if services are not taxable, then a deduction for them is not
allowable. Id. at 64-65.
The argument that the denying of a child care deduction penalizes the working mother
because the mother who remains at home is not taxed on her services is used to criticize the
holding of a recent case which disallowed child care expense deductions. Levy, Income Taxa-
tion - Child Care - Expenses - The Limitations of Section 214(b), I.R. C. 1954, In Respect of
Deduction for Child Care Expenses Are Not Violative of Due Process of Law under the Fifth
Amendment - Nammack v. Comm'r, 56 T. C. 1379 (1971), 41 CINN. L. REv. 264, 272-73 (1972).
By passage of section 214, taxation of imputed income was recognized only partially by
Congress because there is a limitation to the allowable deduction. Comment, Constitutional
Law - Taxation: The Limitations on Child Care Deductions of Section 214 of the Internal
Revenue Code Do Not Deprive Working Mothers of Equal Protection or Due Process of Law,
39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 466 (1972).
20. COMPENDIUM, supra note 8, at 325.
21. Some authorities refer to farm produce consumed on the farm as income in kind.
COMPENDIUM, supra note 8, at 322, 377.
22. The Act of 1867 permitted the exclusion from taxable income of that portion of
farm production consumed on the farm. Revenue Act of 1864, § 117, as amended, 14 Stat.
478 (1867).
23. See note 11 supra. This example can be extended to include any person who grows
some of his own food in a private garden, not on a farm. For example, the city-dweller who
grows beans on his apartment balcony for his personal consumption. This is very similar in
effect to the accountant doing his own plumbing. See notes 13 & 14 supra.
1974] et al.: The Constitutionality of the Taxation of Imputed Income
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would require the farmer to include in income any food which he
produces and consumes directly.
The ultimate conceptual extension of the principle of taxation
of imputed income from self-service and leisure deals with the lei-
sure element. The leisure element arises when an individual who
lives on property income rather than wages has the choice to refrain
from productive activity. Leisure is actually nothing more than con-
sumption of one's own services. 24 The tax treatment of this concept
results in inequity because self-consumption of one's own services
is not taxed, while the sale of one's services to others is taxed as
wages. Equity requires that the value of one's services be included
in income, whether an individual is working or not. Taxation of
imputed income from self-service and leisure meets the equity de-
mand by including in income the value of one's services when not
employed. 5
TREATMENT OF IMPUTED INCOME BY CONGRESS, THE TREASURY DEPART-
MENT AND ECONOMISTS
Past treatment of imputed income indicates varied approaches
and attitudes among Congress, the Treasury Department and econ-
omists. Congress and the Treasury Department have not readily
accepted the principle of imputed income." However, economists
have accepted the concept of imputed income in economic theories
and models which are used to measure the efficiency of our econ-
omy.2
7
Past Congressional and Treasury Department Views on Imputed
Income
Taxation of imputed income has elicited various responses from
Congress and the Treasury Department since the enactment of the
first federal income tax law in the mid-nineteenth century,28 and the
statutory history of the taxation of imputed income has been varied.
While some of the early income tax statutes made no reference to
24. VICKREY, supra note 3, at 48-49.
25. Id.
26. See notes 28-40 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 41-56 infra and accompanying text.
28. Revenue Act of 1861, § 49, 12 Stat. 309.
[Vol. 9Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 8
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imputed income, 9 others specifically excluded it.3° Early in the his-
tory of income taxation in the United States, both the taxpayer3
and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 2 were in favor of the
taxation of imputed rent. Rather than taxing imputed rent to the
homeowner, Congress recognized imputed rent indirectly by allow-
ing a renter to deduct rent paid in order to equalize the situation
between renters and homeowners. 3 Today, of course, no renter's
deduction is allowed because it is deemed a nondeductible personal
expense.34 Thus, disallowance of this deduction continues even
though Congress is aware of the inequity that results from this ap-
proach . 5
The amount of recorded congressional debate in the area of
taxation of imputed income is sparse for two reasons. First, the
taxation of imputed income has never been directly recognized in
the United States.6 In fact, no recent President has included in his
tax message to Congress any reference whatsoever to the principle
29. Revenue Act of 1913, § II.B., 38 Stat. 167; Act of 1894, § 28, 28 Stat. 553; Act of
1870, § 9, 16 Stat. 258; Act of 1861, § 49, 12 Stat. 309.
30. The Act of 1864, § 117, as amended, 14 Stat. 479 (1867), provided that "[tihere
shall be included all income . . . except the rental value of any homestead used or occupied
by any person or by his family in his own right or in the right of his wife."
31. Although the taxpayers were ready to accept such a tax and no complaints about
the administration of such a tax were offered, the House Committee on Ways and Means
rejected such a provision. H. SMITH, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HISTORY FROM
1861 TO 1871 58 (1914). See FINANCE REPORT 70 (1863).
32. The Commissioner stated that "[h]e was unable to see . . . [w]hy one who lives
in his own house should not be taxed on its rental value, as much as if he let it to another
and put the rent in his purse." REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR YEAR
ENDING JUNE 30, 1864, at 13 (1864). The Commissioner has used the same argument at other
times. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1863
(1863); REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE REVENUE (1868).
33. See notes 6 & 31 supra and accompanying text. Allowing such deduction were the
following tax laws: Act of 1870, § 9, 16 Stat. 258; Act of 1864, § 117, as amended, 14 Stat.
478 (1867); Act of 1862, § 91, as amended, 12 Stat. 723 (1863). Silent on the subject was the
Act of 1894, § 28, 28 Stat. 553.
34. Personal, living, or family expenses are disallowed unless expressly provided other-
wise. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
35. It is on record that Congress is aware of the inequity. 50 CONG. REc. 3848 (1913).
36. Imputed rent has been taxed in France and Great Britain in the past. Hearing of
Tax Reform before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 156-57
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Hearing]. Although repealed in 1963, the Income Tax Law,
[1952] 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 10, § 222 (Great Britain), provided that "if a taxpayer
. . . is both owner and occupier. . . of lands . . . the amount of the annual value. . . shall
be deemed to be income." Balch, supra note 1, at 170.
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of the taxation of imputed income. 7 Second, early congressional
debate in the area of taxation was not recorded. Extensive research
of the congressional records has revealed only one series of discus-
sions before the House Committee on Ways and Means dealing
specifically with the concept of the taxation of imputed income.-
From the questions asked in those discussions, it appears that the
major concerns of Congress were whether the taxation of imputed
rent would defeat the incentive of homeownership 39 and whether
such taxation would be constitutional. 0
Economists' Views of Imputed Income
An understanding of the economists' definition of "income" is
important in the study of the taxation of imputed income because
economists often draft many of the tax reform proposals for Con-
gress." Economists have three different definitions of "income": (1)
the Haig-Simon approach; (2) the Irving Fisher definition; and (3)
the Schany approach. The Haig-Simon approach defines income as
37. A perusual of recent tax messages to Congress has revealed no reference to the
taxation of imputed income. Prepared Statements Submitted to the Committee on Ways and
Means by the Honorable John B. Connally, Secretary of the Treasury, and the Honorable
George P. Shultz, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, on the Tax Proposals
Embodied in President Nixon's New Economic Policy before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Summary of Testimony on the Administration's
Legislative Tax Proposals before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971); Tax Recommendations of the President Submitted to Congress Aug. 30, 1970,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); Tax Reform Studies and Proposals by the Treasury Department
before the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committee, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1969); The President's 1963 Tax Message before the House Committee
on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1963); The President's 1961 Tax Recommen-
dations before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
38. Numerous noted tax experts were given the opportunity to present new techniques
and principles of taxation before the House Committee on Ways and Means. Hearing, supra
note 36, at 156-58.
39. An example of some of the questions asked is:
Do you not think that [taxation of imputed rent] could well defeat the purpose
revenuewise in that it would be fundamentally a great deterrent to the present
method of homeownership?
Id. at 157.
40. Id. See notes 88-96 infra and accompanying text.
41. An example of a tax reform proposal using the Haig-Simon definition is Pechman,
Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HAv. L. REv. 63, 64 (1967). Recognizing
that imputed rent comes within the definition of income, one tax proposal would exclude it
on the grounds that it "stands on relatively technical or theoretical tax arguments." Surrey,
Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures
with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARv. L. REV. 352, 395 (1970).
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"the increase or accretion in one's power to satisfy his wants in a
given period insofar as that power consists of (a) money itself, and
(b) anything susceptible of valuation in terms of money."42 Since
the valuation of imputed income is measurable, imputed income
falls within the Haig-Simon definition of income. According to Irv-
ing Fisher, income is a flow of benefits consisting of pleasurable
utilities.4 3 Imputed income also satisfies this definition, because, as
illustrated in the first section of this note, benefits inevitably accrue
to the individual.44 Finally, Schany defines income as "the entire
difference between the value of assets at the end of the fiscal period
and their value at the beginning."45 Imputed income examples
usually do not come within Schany's definition because imputed
income seldom increases the value of assets. However, since the
Haig-Simon definition is the most widely accepted definition, most
economists include imputed income in the area of taxation."
Although most economists include imputed income in the area
of taxation, distinct means of valuation are suggested. For example,
the valuation of imputed rent is susceptible to three alternative
means of computation, although ultimately all yield approximately
the same figure. The methods of valuation include: (1) the net
rental value approach; (2) the return on equity approach; and (3)
the interest rate approach. Assume that an individual owns a house
and desires to compute its annual imputed income figure. The net
rental value is the appraised rental value of the dwelling, i.e., the
figure which represents the amount that the home would rent for in
the marketplace 8.4 The return on equity approach is similar to that
applied by "big business" in capital budgeting decisions; the com-
putation involves discounting to present value all expected future
42. Crockett, The Legal and Economic Concepts of Income, 52 A.B.A.J. 1126, 1126
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Crockett].
43. Id.
44. See notes 3, 6, 8, 11, 13, 20-22, 25 supra and accompanying text.
45. Crockett, supra note 42, at 1128.
46. Id.
47. Differences between the three methods in the short run are due to temporary market
disequilibria (e.g., when the long-run and short-run interest rates are unequal), or risk prem-
iums required on thin equities (i.e., when the amount of bond debt greatly exceeds the
amount of common stock). VICKREY, supra note 3, at 26.
48. For analysis of all three methods of computation see VICKREY, supra note 3, at 20-
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profits earned on a similar investment in the marketplace.49 This
approach requires a determination by the owner of the profits that
would be earned each subsequent year on such asset over the life of
the asset if the owner were to rent it. All of these figures of future
profits are discounted to present value to arrive at the imputed
income calculation. The interest rate approach initially requires a
determination of the dwelling's market value. The value of imputed
rent is then determined by multiplying the hypothetical sales figure
by a predetermined interest rate (e.g., the current rate of a regular
savings account at a savings and loan).5 0
Somewhat analogous to the return on equity approach is the
utilization of a spending tax which some economists advance as an
alternative to the inclusion of imputed income in taxable income.',
Due to the nature of the tax, this alternative treatment would only
apply in cases involving imputed rent and imputed income from
consumer durables (e.g., furniture and appliances), and not in cases
involving imputed income from self-service and leisure." The
spending tax approach, therefore, does not accept the income tax
approach which considers the expenditures on housing and con-
sumer durables as consumption. Rather, the spending tax approach
treats such expenditures as investments in assets; the expenditures
are taxed by writing off the cost of the investment over the useful
life of the asset.13
In addition to defining imputed income, economists have stud-
ied the results of the exclusion of imputed income from taxation.
Two major issues have developed from such studies. First, nontaxa-
tion of such items as imputed rent results in less congressional scru-
tiny. " If the intention of Congress is to promote homeownership,
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id. For a comment on how the spending tax will impair incentives to acquire income
see id. at 344.
53. Id. at 26.
54. Bittker, Accounting for Federal Tax Subsidies in the National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX
J. 244 (1969). Another writer believes that exclusion from taxation would be simpler, but
nevertheless prefers taxation followed by tax subsidies. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income
Concept, 81 HARv. L. REV. 44, 52 (1967); cf. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied
Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance,
84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970) (direct expenditures); Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure
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then taxation of imputed rent followed by tax credits or subsidies
will bring more attention to the subject area because of the
congressional review that accompanies the appropriation of govern-
ment funds. :  The other major issue, based upon economic theory,
is whether nontaxation of imputed income in areas such as housing
causes an inefficient allocation of resources.56 That is, economic
theory shows that more goods and services will ultimately be pro-
vided if imputed income is taxed.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TAXATION OF INCOME
To understand the constitutional analysis of the taxation of
imputed income, it is first necessary to discuss the source of the
power of Congress to tax and to survey the views of the Supreme
Court regarding the constitutional definition of income.
Derivation of the Power to Tax
The present power of Congress to tax flows from a combination
of the sixteenth amendment57 and three clauses of article 15 of the
United States Constitution. While Congress has the power to "lay
and collect taxes, ' 59 apportionment of "direct taxes" among the
states is required by article 1.6° However, the sixteenth amendment
Budget - Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528, 530 (1969) (approach suggests
presenting tax provisions such as exclusions like imputed rent as expenditure classifications
in the federal budget).
55. VICKREY, supra note 3, at 18.
56. The concept of inefficient allocation of resources has been proven by simulated
computer models. Askari, Federal Taxes and the Internal Rate of Return on Owner Occupied
Housing, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 101, 101-03 (1972). See also STUDIES IN SUBSTANTIVE TAX REFORM
137 (A. Willis ed. 1969) (current exclusion of imputed rent from taxable income distorts
resource allocation); Galvin, supra note 14, at 1029 (Canadian commission would tax imputed
income for an equitable system of taxation); Hjorth, A Tax Subsidy for Child Care: Section
210 of the Revenue Act of 1971, 50 TAXES 133, 144 (1972) (economic allocation of resources of
housewives has been interfered with by disallowing child care deductions); Rolph,
Discriminating Effects of the Income Tax Treatment of Owner-Occupants, 26 NAT'L TAX J.
471 (1973) (examines the economic effects due to the exclusion of imputed rent from taxa-
tion).
Contra, Schoenfeld & Steinberg, supra note 6, at 358 (suggests that tax laws regarding
home ownership not be changed since the true evil is inequity between income levels rather
than between owners and renters at the same economic level).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 8, 9.
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 9.
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eliminates the necessity of apportionment if only income is taxed.
It is important to note that since apportionment is deemed imprac-
tical by most commentators," only unapportioned tax statutes are
feasible. If a tax is not apportioned, it then follows that a determina-
tion of whether or not the item which the statute taxes comes within
the definition of "income" is foremost in the constitutional analysis
of each direct tax statute.2 Since every tax on imputed income
would be a direct tax, it is paramount in a study of the constitution-
ality of the taxation of imputed income to determine if imputed
income falls within the constitutional definition of "income."
Constitutional Definition of "Income"
(1) The Macomber Test
The sixteenth amendment did not define the constitutional
meaning of "income ' 6 3 and it has therefore been necessary for the
United States Supreme Court to accept the responsibility in the
construction of the definition of "income." The definition has not
only evolved on an ad hoc basis,64 but it has changed in meaning
over the years. 5 Since the majority view is that Congress, in passing
various tax statutes, intended to tax to the fullest extent constitu-
tionally possible, determining the definition of "income" will in-
clude an analysis not only of what the Supreme Court has stated
when constitutional issues of taxation were raised, but what the
Court's views were in cases involving only statutory interpreta-
tions.66 In the first tax case after the passage of the sixteenth amend-
61. B. BITrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GiF-r TAXATION 38 (4th ed.
1972).
62. Underlying this determination is the dispute as to whether the definition of "in-
come" was changed by the enactment of the sixteenth amendment. The major consensus,
however, is that the sixteenth amendment did not redefine the term. Compare Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920) (sixteenth amendment did not extend the taxing power
to new subjects), and Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1916) (sixteenth
amendment does not purport to confer power to levy income taxes in a generic sense), with
Comm'r v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 62 F.2d 1066, 1067 (6th Cir. 1932).
63. Conner v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 1187, 1189 (S.D.Texas 1969).
64. "What is or is not income within the meaning of the amendment must be deter-
mined in each case according to truth and substance, without regard to form." Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920).
65. See notes 68-87 infra.
66. Some writers agree that the courts have tried to fill the void left by statutes regard-
ing the definition of "income." See Rapp, Some Recent Developments in the Concept of
Taxable Income, 11 TAX L. REV. 329 (1955-56) [hereinafter cited as Rapp]; Crockett, supra
note 42, at 1127.
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ment,"7 which upheld the constitutionality of the 1913 income tax
statute, the Supreme Court was hesitant to exact a clear definition
of "income" under the sixteenth amendment. But shortly thereafter
the Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber8 reinterpreted the six-
teenth amendment and found that it created limitations upon the
definition of "income." 9 The definition of "income" according to
the Macomber court, often termed the realization or severance
theory, is:
the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both
combined, provided it be understood to include profit
gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, and
• . . a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, pro-
ceeding from the property, severed from capital.1 0
The essence of the definition is that in order for income to be
taxed, it has to be severed from the property from which it was
derived. The concept of severance was readily applicable to
Macomber because the case involved a determination as to whether
stock dividends were to be treated as having been severed from
the stock from which the dividend was paid. However, the applica-
bility of the severance theory to the taxation of imputed income has
been doubted by some tax experts and attorneys. For example, re-
sponding to a question before the House Committee on Ways and
Means concerning whether the taxation of imputed rent is constitu-
tional, Lester Ponder, a noted tax lawyer, responded: "My thought
is that under our system, developed over the years, under our in-
come tax system, we have always required some form of a severance
of something in the form of property before we have imposed income
taxes."'" The Macomber decision offers two additional tests - the
realization from labor or capital test and the exchangeable value
test. The former requires that taxable income be derived from labor
or capital and the latter requires that it originate from someone
other than the taxpayer.7 2
67. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
68. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
69. For extended analysis of the definition of "income" see Wright, The Effects of the
Source of Realized Benefits upon the Supreme Court's Concept of Taxable Receipts, 8 STAN.
L. REV. 164, 175-76 (1955-56) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
70. 252 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added).
71. Hearing, supra note 36, at 157.
72. See note 70 supra.
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(2) The Glenshaw Test
Although the severance requirement was once thought to be
essential in every case involving the taxation of income, it appears
that a chain of cases has brought about the demise of the severance
requirement." These cases also appear to have produced the end of
the requirement that taxable income be something of exchangeable
value received by the taxpayer for his separate use,74 and the death
of the notion that receipts are taxable only if realized from capital,
from labor, or from both combined."
Three of the major cases responsible for the demise of the
Macomber tests were United States v. Kirby,78 Rutkin v. United
States 7 and Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.7" In Kirby, the
taxpayer had issued its own bonds to the public and purchased
them back the same year at a lower price. The Court held that this
difference was taxable income. The Kirby court's statement that
"[nlothing [is] to be gained by the study of judicial definitions, ' 7
was evidence of the Court's disenchantment with Macomber. The
general agreement among commentators was that although
Macomber laid down three basic tests, Kirby evidenced the Court's
willingness to be flexible in the determination of the definition of
"income." ' 0 In upholding the taxation of amounts received by extor-
tion, the Rutkin court introduced the demise of the requirement
that taxable gain must have been derived from labor or capital.8 '
Since no reference to the definition of "income" was made in
the Constitution, constitutional analysis as to the definition of "in-
come" is often nothing more than a statement of a conclusion rather
than a presentation of well-reasoned legal theory. For example, in
responding to the constitutional argument, Rutkin merely stated:
"We think the power of Congress to tax these receipts as income
under the Sixteenth Amendment is unquestionable."8 According to
73. Wright, supra note 69, at 182.
74. Id. at 185-93.
75. Id. at 199-201.
76. 284 U.S. 1(1931).
77. 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
78. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
79. 284 U.S. at 3.
80. Wright, supra note 69, at 182.
81. Id. at 193-201.
82. 343 U.S. at 138.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 [1974], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss1/8
IMPUTED INCOME
some writers, 3 the ultimate death of the Macomber tests resulted
from the decision in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.8 4
Glenshaw held that money received as punitive damages from anti-
trust recovery was taxable.85 The Glenshaw court not only ignored
Macomber, but offered a new test-accession to wealth. This new
test looks not to the source of the gain as in Macomber; rather, it
looks merely to whether the taxpayer's wealth has increased. 8
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TAXATION OF IMPUTED INCOME
The Supreme Court's View of the Constitutionality of Taxation of
Imputed Income
The only United States Supreme Court case which has taken a
stand on the taxation of imputed income is Helvering v. Indepen-
dent Life Insurance Co."5 In Independent, an insurance company
owned an office building which was occupied by the company's
investment department and an outside tenant. Pursuant to insur-
ance tax law,"9 the Court held that if the company decided to take
a deduction for expenses of its own building, then the company was
required to include in income an amount which represented the
rental value of the portion of the building which was occupied by
the company's investment department.'" This, in essence, is similar
to the taxation of imputed income; the only difference is that it was
optional in Independent, because if the company had not desired to
take the expense deduction, it would not have been required to
include the imputed rent in income.' But the Court postulated that
if the inclusion of imputed rent had been required, rather than a
mere condition to a deduction, it would not have been constitu-
tional. The Court stated that since the tax was direct,9" unappor-
83. See Rapp, supra note 66, at 366; Wright, supra note 69, at 202 (exact constitutional
notion remains somewhat obscure).
84. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
85. 348 U.S. at 427.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 292 U.S. 371 (1934).
89. Revenue Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 134, §§ 244,245, 43 Stat. 289.
90. 292 U.S. at 371.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 378. Cases cited were: Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1930); Bromley v.
McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929); Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 255 U.S.
288 (1920); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S.
1 (1916); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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tioned and not within the constitutional definition of "income,"93 it
was unconstitutional. Chronologically, it is important to note that
Independent was decided during the period after Macomber, but
before the implementation of the accession to wealth test estab-
lished in Glenshaw. In fact, six of the seven major cases involving
the definition of "income" which were cited in Independent stand
for the proposition that severance is required. 4 Yet as mentioned
earlier in this note,9" the requirement that this test be met is ques-
tionable. The seventh cited case summarily dismissed the constitu-
tional issue of imputed income as a "minute" and "hypercritical"
argument."
The Failure of the Supreme Court to Determine the Constitution-
ality of the Taxation of Imputed Income Has Caused Inconsistent
Lower Court Decisions
Numerous lower court decisions have been reasoned on the for-
tuitous facts in each particular case because of the lack of a determi-
nation by the Supreme Court of the constitutionality of the taxation
of imputed income. The lower courts appear to be groping for a
rational approach, but inevitably they rely on mere matter of form
and not the substance of the transaction. Although it is not spelled
out verbatim, there is a general notion in the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 that substance should rule over form.
In the case of a bargain purchase, the courts appear to be in
favor of the taxation of imputed income, although little constitu-
tional justification is demonstrated. 7 Specifically, bargain pur-
chases as noted herein include only those fact situations where an
employee, whether he is an agent, broker, salesman or partner, pur-
chases from his employer a product at a price lower than what the
93. 292 U.S. at 379. This argument was based upon: MacLaughlin v. Alliance Ins. Co.,
286 U.S. 244 (1932); Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.,
271 U.S. 170 (1920); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co.,
247 U.S. 179 (1918); Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913).
94. MacLaughlin v. Alliance Ins. Co., 286 U.S. 244 (1932); Burk-Waggoner Ass'n v.
Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1932); Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1920); Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1920); Stratton's
Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913).
95. See notes 73-87 supra.
96. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 1 (1916). See Balch, supra note 1, at 170.
97. Haskell & Kauffman, supra note 2.
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general public would be required to pay. The question is whether
the difference between the price offered to the public and the em-
ployee's price should be taxable as income to the employee.
Since the Supreme Court has not dealt specifically with the
constitutionality of imputed income in relation to bargain pur-
chases, lower courts have felt compelled at least to touch base with
the Macomber reasoning (realization and severance). Whether
Glenshaw and the accession to wealth approach would apply to
bargain purchase situations has not yet been determined. The ques-
tion would be whether a discount is an accession to one's wealth as
required in Glenshaw. Accordingly, the trend has been that if the
courts determine that the employer and employee are separate enti-
ties, then the discount is usually taxable. For example, Toy v.
Commissioner" held that a partner of a real estate firm should have
been taxed on the amount of commissions he received, even though
it arose from sales to himself. In Toy the taxpayer had purchased
properties from the partnership, paying the same commissions as
the public would in such a sale. These commissions were then in-
cluded as partnership income which was ultimately distributed pro
rata to the partners according to the partnership agreement. Some
of that which was payable to the taxpayer was obviously from his
own transaction. Without the aid of a clear mandate from Congress
or direction from the Supreme Court to tax imputed income, the
Toy court necessarily had to construct a fiction to hold the amount
taxable. The fiction was that partnerships are separate and distinct
entities. Although this might be the case under state laws governing
partnerships, it is not correct at the federal tax level, because part-
nerships are not separate taxable entities.9
Another case evidencing a possible fiction is Daehler v.
Commissioner.0 0 Daehler held taxable the amount refunded to a
real estate salesman from his employer as a commission on a house
the salesman himself had purchased. 0' Although the parties may
not have intended this transaction to be compensation, but rather
98. 1942 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1128.
99. "A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax." INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 701.
100. 31 T.C. 722 (1959).
101. Id.
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a mere reduction of the price paid for the house, the court held that
it was compensation and hence taxable."°2
Toy and Daehler fall within the theory of the taxation of im-
puted income from self-service and leisure, since the taxpayer in
each instance had performed a service for himself by acting as sales-
man. It is of interest that no problems would have arisen if the
Supreme Court had previously deemed that taxation of imputed
income was constitutional. That is, the courts would not have had
to base their decisions on a possible fiction. The result would be that
no case would be based on the mere fortuitous findings of the court.
CONCLUSION
A redetermination of the constitutionality of the taxation of
imputed income would seem appropriate since the Supreme Court
appears quite flexible in defining "income" under the federal in-
come tax laws. Some writers 3 postulate that the Supreme Court
fosters the belief that the taxation of imputed income is unconstitu-
tional because Helvering v. Independent Life Insurance Co. 14 is
often cited by the courts. However, it should be noted that of all the
cases citing Independent, only four are addressed to the imputed
income issue. Of the four cases addressed to this issue, only United
States v. Atlas Life Insurance Co. has reached the Supreme Court.05
Atlas holds that the exclusion of imputed rent is constitutional, but
refuses to take the opportunity to decide the constitutionality of the
inclusion of imputed rent in income. The remaining three lower
court cases merely affirm Independent without reason. 106 Other
cases citing Independent can be grouped into two classes. First, a
number of cases cite Independent for the principle that all deduc-
tions are a matter of legislative grace.0 7 The second group cites
Independent for the proposition that Congress may place any condi-
102. Gross income includes commissions. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a)(1).
103. See Balch, supra note 1, at 171; Rapp, supra note 66, at 368.
104. 292 U.S. 371 (1934). See notes 88-93 supra.
105. 381 U.S. 233 (1965).
106. Crystal Lake Cemetery Ass'n v. United States, 413 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1969); Ameri-
can Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 91 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1937); Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Comm'r,
30 B.T.A. 874 (1934).
107. See, e.g., Avery v. Comm'r, 84 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1936); Weber Flour Mills Co. v.
Comm'r, 82 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1936); Miller v. Comm'r, 40 B.T.A. 515 (1939).
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tion on deductions."'" It is therefore submitted that the constitution-
ality of imputed income is indeed open to question.
The offering of an historical purview of the constitutionality of
income in general presented a foundation for the determination of
the constitutionality of imputed income. It should be noted that at
least one eminent Supreme Court Justice suggests that the constitu-
tional definition of income is truly nebulous and susceptible to the
various interpretations of each particular Justice.'"9 With this in
mind, two constitutional tests (Macomber and Glenshaw) are sug-
gested. It is proposed that the constitutionality of imputed income
depends strictly upon whether the income test of Macomber or
Glenshaw is applied.
If the Macomber severance test is applied, the reasoning in the
dictum of Independent could be advanced to show that taxation of
imputed income is unconstitutional. However, this has never been
done and it is very possible that the Court would consider the taxa-
tion of imputed income constitutional. Since Macomber was the
first case to take a stand on defining income, it derived its test from
the facts in that case. The result is that the Macomber test is too
restrictive, and it is the Glenshaw test that was developed to expand
Macomber.
In employing the Glenshaw test, the only issue regarding the
constitutionality of the taxation of imputed income is the determi-
nation of whether imputed income is an accession to one's wealth.
The following two examples are offered in regard to this issue. First,
the accession to wealth in the area of imputed rent is the savings
accumulated by owning rather than renting a house. This figure is
the amount by which the increase in homeowner's equity in the
home exceeds the amount that a similar taxpayer is required to pay
in rent for such a house. A second example of accession deals with
farm consumption. The accession to wealth is the amount that the
farmer saves by consuming his own produce rather than purchasing
such food at the supermarket. (It is assumed that this amount more
than offsets the income the farmer loses in not selling the produce
108. See, e.g., Lamont v. Comm'r, 120 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1941); Merchants' Bank Bldg.
Co. v. Helvering, 84 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1936); Delsanter v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 845 (1957);
Winmill v. Comm'r, 35 B.T.A. 804 (1937).
109. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955) (Black, J., concurring).
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he consumes.) Both of these examples demonstrate that the savings
which a taxpayer accumulates by choosing one alternative over the
other is actually an accession to the taxpayer's wealth. The tax-
payer's accumulated savings, or his accession to wealth, result from
imputed income as determined by an expansion of Glenshaw. The
determination of the above accession to wealth resulting from im-
puted income is derived from an expansion ofrthe Glenshaw test in
that the taxpayer receives benefits from owning his own house or
producing his own food. It is an expansion because Glenshaw has
been applied only where there is an increase in income to the tax-
payer rather than mere accumulated savings as herein described.
Although it has been proven that from an economic standpoint
the taxation of imputed income would produce a better allocation
of our national resources,"10 it is not feasible to tax every imputed
income item discussed above. Application of a tax as described in
the section of this note explaining the concept of imputed income
might indeed conflict with current policies of the Internal Revenue
Code such as the provisions which promote homeownership. Also,
such a tax might be difficult to assess and collect. However, a deter-
mination by the Court that the taxation of imputed income is con-
stitutional would be helpful in the area of bargain purchases. This
acceptance of the Glenshaw reasoning by the courts in the area of
bargain purchases should be made so that all further decisions in-
volving bargain purchases will not be based upon the fortuitous
choice of either the Glenshaw or Macomber test. If this is accepted,
lower courts will need only look to see if the transaction is a bargain
purchase and will not be required to find a fiction that there is a
separate taxable entity from which the taxpayer receives compensa-
tion. Not only will court decisions become consistent, but taxation
of imputed income (at least as to bargain purchases) will be found
to be a constitutionally valid and truly representative tax.
110. C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS-PKINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 393 (3d ed. 1966).
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